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Comments 
A Shot in the Dark: The Need to Clearly 
Define a Lawyer’s Obligations Upon the 
Intentional Receipt of Documents from an 
Anonymous Third Party 
Mitchell James Kendrick* 
ABSTRACT 
 
“[R]ight is right, and wrong is wrong, and a body ain’t got no 
business doing wrong when he ain’t ignorant and knows better.”1 
 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) was adopted because 
lawyers sometimes receive confidential or privileged information that was 
mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. Under 
Rule 4.4(b), if a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such 
information was sent inadvertently, then the lawyer is required to notify 
the sender. However, the ABA has made clear that Rule 4.4(b) does not 
apply when a lawyer is the intentional recipient of such information. 
 
*J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law 2019. Many thanks 
to my fellow members of the Penn State Law Review for their generous feedback that 
helped me develop this Comment. I would also like to thank my friends and family for 
their support throughout law school and the Comment-writing process. Without your 
encouragement and guidance, none of this would have been possible. 
 1. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 327 (Harper & Brothers 
1896) (1884).  
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As a result, courts have created confusion for lawyers by imposing 
different obligations upon lawyers that are the intentional recipients of 
such information. Some courts have relied on outdated ethics opinions to 
propose a proper course of conduct, while others have created new 
standards. Some courts have even advocated that the scope of Rule 4.4(b) 
should be interpreted broadly to apply in these circumstances. 
Consequently, lawyers and their clients risk being penalized or placed at a 
disadvantage during litigation if their chosen course of conduct is viewed 
as improper in the eyes of a court. 
This Comment will argue that a clear standard is needed to govern 
the duties and obligations of a lawyer upon the intentional receipt of 
unsolicited privileged or confidential information. A clear standard will 
help both lawyers and courts distinguish between proper and improper 
ethical conduct. Moreover, a clear standard is also needed to assist lawyers 
in managing the tension between their duty of zealous advocacy and 
staying within the boundaries of proper legal ethics. This Comment will 
ultimately argue that the ABA is in the best position to set forth a clear 
standard outlining a lawyer’s duties and obligations upon the intentional 
receipt of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The methods by which information can be obtained prior to litigation 
and during discovery is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
state law, and state ethics rules.2 Remarkably, none of these authorities 
impose any duties or obligations upon a lawyer who is the  intentional 
recipient of unsolicited privileged or confidential information.3 As a result, 
courts have created confusion for lawyers by imposing different 
obligations upon lawyers who are the intentional recipients of such 
information.4 
Because “discovery is . . . party-driven,” the rules governing this 
process need to be clearly defined so that lawyers can ensure they are 
engaging in conduct that is within the bounds of the law and proper legal 
ethics.5 The process of gathering information can be “extremely 
burdensome,” expensive, and take longer “than any other part of a civil 
lawsuit.”6 This burden is further complicated by “adversarial dynamics” 
that pressure parties to abuse the process.7 Consequently, because no clear 
standard exists to govern the duties and obligations of a lawyer upon the 
intentional receipt of privileged or confidential information, recipient 
lawyers struggle to distinguish between proper and improper ethical 
conduct.8 
The root cause of this problem is that the American Bar Association 
(ABA) has opined that intentionally disclosed information should be 
treated differently than information that is inadvertently disclosed.9 To 
address the problems of an adversary’s inadvertent disclosure of 
privileged or confidential information, the ABA adopted Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 4.4(b) (“Rule 4.4(b)”).10 Rule 4.4(b) “requires a 
lawyer who knows that a document or electronically stored information 
was sent inadvertently . . . to notify the sending lawyer.”11 On its face, 
 
 2. See JOSEPH W. GLANNON, ANDREW M. PERLMAN & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 769–771 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2d ed. 2015) (discussing the scope of 
discovery and the types of authority that govern a party’s informal investigation before 
filing a complaint). 
 3. See infra Section III.A. 
 4. See infra Section II.B. 
 5. See GLANNON, PERLMAN & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, at 857. 
 6. Id. at 857–58. 
 7. Id. at 858.  
 8. See infra Section III.  
 9. See infra Section II.A.  
 10. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006).  
 11. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 399 (Robert C. 
Clark et al. eds., 6th ed. 2017) (emphasis added); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
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however, Rule 4.4(b) does not apply to intentionally disclosed 
information.12 
Since the adoption of Rule 4.4(b), the ABA has made clear that Rule 
4.4(b) does not impose ethical duties and obligations upon a lawyer who 
is the intentional recipient of privileged or confidential information.13 As 
a result, lawyers and courts have been grappling with conflicting authority 
to identify the proper ethical duties and obligations of a recipient lawyer.14 
Part II of this Comment discusses how this lack of clarity has led 
courts to adopt inconsistent standards when addressing a recipient 
lawyer’s conduct.15 Some courts have relied on outdated ethics opinions 
to propose a proper course of conduct, while others have created new 
standards.16 Some courts have even advocated that the scope of Rule 4.4(b) 
should be interpreted broadly to apply in these circumstances.17 
Part III of this discussion focuses on how the emergence of these 
varying approaches has made it difficult for both lawyers and courts to 
draw the line between proper and improper ethical conduct under these 
circumstances.18 Part III also addresses how leaving ethical boundaries ill-
defined can be particularly troublesome in light of the duty lawyers have 
to zealously assert their clients’ position.19 This Comment ultimately 
argues that the ABA needs to adopt a clear standard to assist lawyers and 
courts in ascertaining a recipient lawyer’s duties and obligations upon the 
intentional receipt of privileged or confidential information.20 
II. BACKGROUND 
To fully explore the ethical obligations that attach to a lawyer who is 
the recipient of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents, an 
evaluation of the chronicle of events that has led to this grey area of law is 
 
 12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (stating that 
“[a] lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the 
representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the 
document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify 
the sender”). 
 13. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) 
(stating that “[w]hether a lawyer may be required to take any action in such an event is a 
matter of law beyond the scope of Rule 4.4(b)”).  
 14. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 
2831485, at *16–22 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017) (finding that sanctions were appropriate even 
though the plaintiffs’ lawyers insisted that no authority placed an ethical obligation upon 
them to notify the opposing lawyers that they had received unsolicited privileged and 
confidential documents from an anonymous source). 
 15. See infra Sections II.B.1-.3. 
 16. See infra Sections II.B.1–.2. 
 17. See infra Section II.B.3. 
 18. See infra Section III.A. 
 19. See infra Section III.B.  
 20. See infra Section III.C.  
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imperative.21 This section will outline how a lack of guidance from the 
ABA has resulted in inconsistent standards being applied across different 
jurisdictions when deciding how a lawyer is to act upon receiving 
unsolicited privileged or confidential documents.22 
A. The Lack of Guidance from the ABA and the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) are not 
binding on anyone or any court; rather, they serve as a model for states’ 
rules that govern and guide the ethical conduct of lawyers.23 Since 1983, 
almost all of the states have adopted a version of the Model Rules.24 While 
states’ ethical rules may not mirror the Model Rules verbatim, courts often 
turn to the ABA and “rely on” its rules when evaluating a lawyer’s 
conduct.25 Unfortunately, when questioning the ethical duties and 
obligations that attach to a lawyer upon the receipt of unsolicited and 
intentionally disclosed privileged or confidential documents, the ABA has 
made clear that lawyers and courts cannot turn to its Model Rules for 
guidance.26 
1. Standard of Conduct Prior to the Adoption of Rule 4.4(b) 
Prior to the ABA’s adoption of Rule 4.4(b),27 the Standing 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (the “Committee”) 
 
 21. See Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the 
Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 176 (1996) (explaining the 
importance of knowing more than the ethics rules themselves). The authors stated: 
Rules by themselves lack definition, depth, and applicability until and unless 
they are read along with the stories and narratives that illustrate their content, 
reach, and purpose. . . . The rules, and the narratives that give those rules purpose 
and direction, must be understood by the persons whose behavior they seek to 
shape, and by the private and public institutions and officials who are in a 
position to enforce them.  
Id. 
 22. See Michele Grant, Legislative Lawyers and the Model Rules, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 823, 826 (2001) (discussing how the Model Rules “enable” lawyers to “measure 
[their] conduct against specific ethical standards”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT pmbl., paras. 1–2, 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (stating that lawyers are guided by 
the model rules, their “personal conscience,” and their “professional peers”). 
 23. HAZARD, supra note 11, at 28. 
 24. Id. at 30 (highlighting that California is the only state that has not adopted a 
version of the Model Rules; however, California has drawn from the Model Rules in its 
efforts to revise its ethical rules). 
 25. Id. at 28. 
 26. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) 
(stating that “[w]hether a lawyer may be required to take any action in such an event is a 
matter of law beyond the scope of Rule 4.4(b)”). 
 27. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).   
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opined that duties and obligations must be placed upon a lawyer who is 
the intentional recipient of unsolicited privileged or confidential 
documents.28 The Committee reasoned that creating standards of conduct 
was necessary to avoid placing a party “at the mercy” of an adversary who 
could potentially use the party’s confidential materials.29 
The Committee announced these specific duties and obligations in 
ABA Formal Opinion 94-382: 
A lawyer who receives on an unauthorized basis materials of an 
adverse party that she knows to be privileged or confidential should, 
upon recognizing the privileged or confidential nature of the materials, 
either refrain from reviewing such material or review them only to the 
extent required to determine how appropriately to proceed; she should 
notify her adversary’s lawyer that she has such materials and should 
either follow instruction of the adversary’s lawyer with respect to the 
disposition of the materials, or refrain from using the materials until a 
definitive resolution of the proper disposition of the materials is 
obtained from a court.30  
In formulating these duties and obligations, the Committee articulated a 
standard of conduct that should apply in circumstances where privileged 
or confidential documents are intentionally sent to a lawyer.31 Formal 
Opinion 94-382 provided courts with clear guidance for adjudicating 
matters regarding a lawyer’s actions after the lawyer’s unsolicited, 
intentional receipt of privileged or confidential documents.32 
 
 28. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994) 
(withdrawn by ABA Formal Opinion 06-440 in 2006); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (dealing with the confidentiality of information in 
the client-lawyer relationship). 
 29. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994) 
(withdrawn by ABA Formal Opinion 06-440 in 2006); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 4.4 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (stating that for the purposes of Rule 4.4, 
“‘document or electronically stored information’ includes in addition to paper documents, 
email and other forms of electronically stored information . . . .”). 
 30. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994) 
(withdrawn by ABA Formal Opinion 06-440 in 2006). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 351 (Tex. 1998) (stating that ABA Formal 
Opinion 94-382 “represents the standard to which attorneys should aspire in dealing with 
an opponent’s privileged information,” and that the ABA’s approach “ensures that the harm 
resulting from an unauthorized disclosure of privileged information will be held to a 
minimum”); see also Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus., Ltd., No. 93 C 4899, 1996 WL 
288511, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 1996) (adopting ABA Formal Opinion 94-382 as the 
appropriate standard of conduct required by a lawyer upon the receipt of information of an 
opposing party that may be confidential or subject to the attorney-client privilege). 
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However, after the adoption of Rule 4.4(b), the ABA withdrew 
Formal Opinion 94-382 in its entirety.33 The ABA based its decision to 
withdraw Formal Opinion 94-382 on the ground that the advice it 
proffered was not supported by the Model Rules.34 The withdrawal left 
lawyers and courts without a clear standard to determine whether a lawyer 
acted properly after receiving privileged or confidential documents.35 
2. Rule 4.4(b) Does Not Apply to Intentionally Disclosed 
Documents 
On its face, Rule 4.4(b) does not apply to privileged or confidential 
documents that are intentionally disclosed to lawyers.36 Rule 4.4(b) 
provides that “[a] lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored 
information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows 
or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored 
information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”37 
Neither the text of Rule 4.4(b) nor its supplementing comments address 
the receipt of intentionally disclosed privileged or confidential 
documents.38 
Moreover, the ABA clarified that Rule 4.4(b) does not apply when 
documents are sent intentionally by issuing Formal Opinion 06-440.39 
Formal Opinion 06-440 explicitly makes clear that “if the providing of the 
materials is not the result of the sender’s inadvertence, Rule 4.4(b) does 
not apply.”40 Lawyers who are the intentional recipient of such materials 
are “therefore not required to notify another party or that party’s lawyer of 
 
 33. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) 
(withdrawing Formal Opinion 94-382 in its entirety). The withdrawal of an ABA opinion 
signifies that the opinion withdrawn is no longer an accurate representation of proper 
ethical conduct. See Kyko Glob. Inc. v. Prithvi Info. Sols. Ltd., No. C13-1034 MJP, 2014 
WL 2694236, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2014) (rejecting the defendant’s motion to 
disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel because it “is based on . . . an outdated ABA opinion”); Mt. 
Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125, 131 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (stating 
that “[t]he court will disregard the cases . . . [that] cite to the withdrawn Opinions”). 
 34. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) 
(withdrawing Formal Opinion 94-382 in its entirety). 
 35. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442, at 2 n.7 
(2006) (“[T]here is no Model Rule that addresses the duty of a recipient of advertently 
transmitted information.”). 
 36. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).  
 37. Id. (emphasis added). 
 38. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4 cmts. 1–3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2002) (lacking any discussion regarding intentionally disclosed privileged or confidential 
information). 
 39. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) 
(withdrawing Formal Opinion 94-382 in its entirety). 
 40. Id.  
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receipt as a matter of compliance with the Model Rules.”41 Further, the 
ABA indicated that “[w]hether a lawyer may be required to take any action 
in such an event is a matter of law beyond the scope of Rule 4.4(b).”42 
3. Reaffirming the Limited Scope of Rule 4.4(b) 
In 2011, the ABA reaffirmed the limited scope of Rule 4.4(b), which 
applies only to situations where documents are sent inadvertently.43 In 
Formal Opinion 11-460,44 the Committee addressed the ethical duties and 
obligations of lawyers when provided with copies of e-mails between a 
third party and the third party’s lawyer.45 The Committee applied a 
textualist approach and reasoned that Rule 4.4(b) did not apply to this 
situation because the e-mails were “not ‘inadvertently sent’ by either” the 
client or the lawyer.46 
Formal Opinion 11-460 thus marked the third time the Committee 
had reasoned that when a lawyer is the recipient of documents that were 
not inadvertently produced, the lawyer did not have to provide notice to 
the opposing party upon receipt.47 The Committee did advise, however, 
that lawyers should proceed with caution when they are the intentional 
recipient of privileged or confidential documents.48 The Committee noted 
that although “the Model Rules do not independently impose an ethical 
duty” upon a recipient lawyer, “[t]o say that Rule 4.4(b) . . . [is] 
 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 
(2006) (declining to interpret Rule 4.4(b) or other Rules to require notice to opposing 
counsel other than in the situation that Rule 4.4(b) specifically addresses). The Committee 
reasoned that the “recent addition of Rule 4.4(b) identifying the sole requirement of 
providing notice to the sender of the receipt of inadvertently sent information [was] 
evidence of the intention to set no other specific restrictions on the receiving lawyer’s 
conduct . . . .” Id. 
 43. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. The Committee used a hypothetical to illustrate the question they were 
posed: “When an employer’s lawyer receives copies of an employee’s private 
communications with counsel, which the employer located in the employee’s business e-
mail file or on the employee’s workplace computer or other device, the question arises 
whether the employer’s lawyer must notify opposing counsel pursuant to Rule 4.4(b).” Id. 
 46. Id. (stating that “[a] ‘document [is] inadvertently sent’ to someone when it is 
accidentally transmitted to an unintended recipient” but that “a document is not 
‘inadvertently sent’ when it is retrieved by a third person from a public or private place 
where it is stored or left”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2002); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) 
(proffering that if the receipt of “materials is not the result of the sender’s inadvertence, 
Rule 4.4(b) does not apply”). 
 47. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011); 
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006); ABA Comm. 
on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006).  
 48. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011).  
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inapplicable is not to say that courts cannot or should not” place 
obligations upon lawyers “pursuant to their supervisory or other 
authority.”49 
Despite the Committee’s cautionary statements, a void still exists.50 
Lawyers looking to the Model Rules for guidance on how to handle the 
intentional receipt of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents will 
find little instruction.51 As a result, lawyers often find themselves 
navigating through a grey area between proper and improper ethical 
conduct with little instruction.52 
B. The Inconsistent Standards from Courts Across Different 
Jurisdictions 
After the ABA adopted Rule 4.4(b) and withdrew Formal Opinion 
94-382, courts were left without guidance on how to determine what duties 
and obligations should be placed upon a lawyer who is the intentional 
recipient of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents.53 As a result, 
courts disagree on how to properly make such a determination.54 Some 
courts have relied on withdrawn Formal Opinion 94-382 to propose a 
proper course of conduct, while others have created new standards.55 Some 
courts have even advocated that the scope of Rule 4.4(b), and states’ rules 
of professional conduct that mirror it, should be interpreted broadly to 
govern situations where a lawyer is the intentional recipient of unsolicited 
privileged or confidential documents.56 
 
 49. Id.  
 50. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 
2831485, at *10 (D. Kan. Jun. 30, 2017) (noting a “lack of clarity and direction” from the 
ABA Model Rules and opinions).  
 51. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
 52. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 53. See HAZARD, supra note 11, at 28 (stating that although the Model “[R]ules do not 
have the force of law . . . the ABA has long been recognized as the leading national 
organization of lawyers, and it has succeeded in persuading state courts, federal courts, and 
federal agencies to adopt some form of its model codes,” and that “courts often refer to, 
rely on and even incorporate ethics rules in applying other law to lawyers”). 
 54. See, e.g., In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 351–52 (Tex. 1998) (relying on 
withdrawn Formal Opinion 94-382); Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Mgmt. Americas, Inc., 
20 F. Supp. 3d 428, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (creating a new standard for determining whether 
sanctions are appropriate); Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 665 (N.J. 
2010) (expanding the scope of Rule 4.4(b) to reach its conclusion). 
 55. See, e.g., In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d at 351–52 (relying on withdrawn Formal 
Opinion 94-382); Niceforo, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 432 (creating a new standard for determining 
whether sanctions are appropriate). 
 56. See, e.g., Stengart, 990 A.2d at 665 (expanding the scope of Rule 4.4(b) to reach 
its conclusion).  
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These inconsistent standards have created confusion for lawyers.57 
Consequently, lawyers and their clients risk being penalized or placed at a 
disadvantage during litigation because of an improperly chosen course of 
conduct upon the receipt of such documents.58 This section will explore 
the various approaches taken by courts in an attempt to define what a 
lawyer’s proper course of conduct is upon the intentional receipt of 
unsolicited privileged or confidential documents.59 
1. Relying on Withdrawn Formal Opinions 
The first approach taken by courts in determining the proper course 
of conduct is to rely on withdrawn ABA Formal Opinions. Before the 
ABA adopted Rule 4.4(b) and subsequently withdrew Formal Opinion 94-
382, the Supreme Court of Texas in In re Meador60 determined whether a 
lawyer should be disqualified for failing to comply with an opposing 
party’s request to return privileged documents that the lawyer received 
from a third party.61 The Texas Supreme Court asserted that “ABA Formal 
Opinion 94-382 represents the standard to which attorneys should aspire 
in dealing with an opponent’s privileged information.”62 
Relying on the ABA’s reasoning in Formal Opinion 94-382, the court 
established a six-factor test (the “Meador test”)63 for determining whether 
 
 57. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 
2831485, at *4–5, *19–20 (D. Kan. Jun. 30, 2017). Plaintiffs’ counsel relied on 
independent counsel, state ethics rules, and caselaw in making her decision not to 
immediately notify opposing counsel or the court upon the receipt of potentially privileged 
documents. Id. at *4–5. The court ordered evidentiary sanctions upon Plaintiffs’ counsel 
as well as the indemnification of attorney’s fees incurred by Defendant’s counsel as a result 
of the Plaintiffs’ counsel’s failure to notify. Id. at *19–20. 
 58. See Lee v. Max Int’l, LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing In re 
Baker, 744 F.2d 1438, 1440 (10th Cir. 1984)) (“[W]e have said that district courts enjoy 
‘very broad discretion to use sanctions where necessary to insure . . . that lawyers and 
parties . . . fulfill their high duty to insure the expeditious and sound management of the 
preparation of cases for trial.’”); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 
(1991) (“Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their creation, 
with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to 
their lawful mandates.”). 
 59. See infra Sections II.B.1-.3.  
 60. In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. 1998). 
 61. Id. at 348-49.  
 62. Id. at 351. 
 63. In exercising judicial discretion, courts “must consider all the facts and 
circumstances to determine whether the interest of justice require disqualification.” Id. at 
351. The court in In re Meador stated: 
[A] trial could should consider, among others, these factors: (1) whether the 
attorney knew or should have known that the material was privileged; (2) the 
promptness with which the attorney notifies the opposing side that he or she has 
received its privileged information; (3) the extent to which the attorney reviews 
and digests the privileged information; (4) the significance of the privileged 
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a lawyer’s course of conduct after receiving potentially privileged or 
confidential documents warrants disqualification.64 Despite the ABA’s 
withdrawal of Formal Opinion 94-382, some courts have continued to rely 
on the Meador test in making such determinations.65 
In contrast, other courts have declined to adopt the Meador test when 
tasked with making similar determinations regarding the disqualification 
of a lawyer.66 One of the main reasons courts have rejected the Meador 
test is because the test is based on a withdrawn ABA Formal Opinion.67 
However, in the absence of a rule or opinion from the ABA regarding what 
would be considered appropriate conduct upon the intentional receipt of 
privileged or confidential documents, withdrawn Formal Opinion 94-382 
continues to serve as a basis both for lawyers to ground their arguments 
and for courts to make their decisions.68 
 
information; i.e., the extent to which its disclosure may prejudice the movant’s 
claim or defense, and the extent to which return of the documents will mitigate 
that prejudice; (5) the extent to which movant may be at fault for the 
unauthorized disclosure; (6) the extent to which the nonmovant will suffer 
prejudice from the disqualification of his or her attorney. 
Id. at 351–52. 
 64. Id. at 351-52 (stating that “[t]he ABA’s approach reflects the importance of the 
discovery privileges, and ensures that the harm resulting from an unauthorized disclosure 
of privileged information will be held to a minimum”); see also Richards v. Jain, 168 F. 
Supp. 2d 1195, 1205 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (finding that the factors set out in Meador are 
“helpful in evaluating a motion to disqualify”). 
 65. See In re RSR Corp., 475 S.W.3d 775, 778 (Tex. 2015) (ruling that “[t]he factors 
explained by Meador are appropriate” for evaluating whether counsel should be 
disqualified); see also Merits Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev. ex rel. 
County of Clark, 262 P.3d 720, 726 (Nev. 2011) (adopting the six-factor Meador test). 
 66. See Foss Mar. Co. v. Brandewiede, 359 P.3d 905, 910 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015); see 
also Foss Mar. Co.’s Response Brief at 22-36, Foss Mar. Co. v. Brandewiede, 359 P.3d 
905 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (No.71611-5-I), 2014 WL 7406825, *22–36 (arguing that 
“[t]he Meador test comports with Washington case law governing attorney disqualification 
and should be adopted and applied by [the] Court”). 
 67. See Kyko Glob. Inc. v. Prithvi Info. Sols. Ltd., No. C13-1034 MJP, 2014 WL 
2694236, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2014) (rejecting the Defendant’s motion to disqualify 
Plaintiffs’ counsel because it “is based on a case applying an old version of the model 
ethical rules and an outdated ABA opinion”); see also Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., 
Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125, 131 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (stating that “[t]he court will disregard the 
cases . . . [that] cite to the withdrawn Opinions”). 
 68. See Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 
WL 4368617, at *14-15 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017) (relying on the six-factor test for the 
disqualification of counsel established in In Re Meador, which is based on the ABA’s 
reasoning in withdrawn Formal Opinion 94-382); see also Brief of Respondent and 
Opening Brief of Cross-Appellant at 55-56, In re Marriage of Templin & Klavano (Wash. 
Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2016), 2016 WL 1261183, at *55-56 (arguing that a lawyer’s conduct 
was unethical because he did not act in accordance with withdrawn ABA Formal Opinion 
94-382).  
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2. Expanding the Scope of Rule 4.4(b) 
In response to Rule 4.4(b) and the withdrawal of Formal Opinion 94-
382, some states and courts have taken a second approach and concluded 
that the scope of Rule 4.4(b) should be expanded to govern situations 
where a lawyer is the intentional recipient of privileged or confidential 
documents.69 For example, in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency,70 the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey relied on a New Jersey Rule of Professional 
Conduct71 “patterned” off of Rule 4.4(b) to conclude that a law firm 
violated its ethical duties after receiving documents containing privileged 
and confidential communications between the opposing party and her 
lawyer.72 The court reasoned that because the law firm failed to notify the 
opposing party  after receiving the documents, the law firm violated its 
ethical obligations under New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 
4.4(b).73 
The law firm argued that it had no ethical duty to notify the opposing 
party under the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct because the 
documents that it had received were not sent “inadvertently.”74 However, 
the court rejected this argument and concluded that the law firm did in fact 
have an ethical duty to notify the opposing party of its receipt of the 
documents.75 In reaching this conclusion, the court expanded the scope of 
New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b),76 which mirrored Rule 
4.4(b)’s “inadvertently sent” language, to conclude that the law firm was 
required to give notice to opposing counsel even though the documents 
were not “inadvertently” provided to the law firm.”77 
Despite the ABA’s opinion that Rule 4.4(b) does not apply when 
privileged or confidential documents are “not the result of the sender’s 
inadvertence,” courts have continued to follow the approach in Stengart 
and expand the scope of rules of professional conduct that mirror Rule 
 
 69. See Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 665–66 (N.J. 2010). 
 70. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010).  
 71. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (amended 2016).  
 72. Stengart, 990 A.2d at 665–66. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 666. 
 76. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (amended 2016).  
 77. See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 665; see also N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) 
(amended 2016) (providing that “[a] lawyer who receives a document and has reasonable 
cause to believe that the document was inadvertently sent shall . . . promptly notify the 
sender”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (providing 
that “[a] lawyer who receives a document . . . and knows or reasonably should know that 
the document . . . was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender”). 
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4.4(b).78 For example, in Merits Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District 
Court of Nevada ex rel. County of Clark,79 a lawyer was the recipient of 
an anonymous package that contained a disk holding allegedly privileged 
and confidential information of the opposing party.80 Upon receiving the 
disk, the lawyer disclosed his receipt of the disk to the opposing party and 
provided them with a copy of the disk.81 The opposing party did not 
respond to the initial disclosure, but later argued that the lawyer and his 
law firm violated their ethical duties by reviewing the information on the 
disk.82 
The court, and both the parties, agreed that Nevada Rule of 
Professional Conduct 4.4(b)83 was not applicable “as written.”84 The court 
then reasoned that applying Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) 
“by analogy, which requires an attorney to notify the sender if he or she 
receives documents inadvertently,” was the appropriate basis on which the 
court should make its determination, thereby expanding the rule’s 
application beyond its explicit language.85 
The ABA has recognized the tendency of some courts to expand the 
scope of Rule 4.4(b) and its counterparts to require disclosure in situations 
where documents are intentionally disclosed.86 However, this recognition 
provides little clarity because the ABA simply notes that “other law” may 
impose obligations upon a receiving lawyer that may prevent the lawyer 
from keeping and using the received documents.87 Additionally, the ABA 
has stated that various civil procedure rules and courts, pursuant to their 
“supervisory” authority, may impose obligations upon a receiving 
lawyer.88 Because the ABA has not identified any particular authority that 
 
 78. See, e.g., Merits Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev. ex rel. 
County of Clark, 262 P.3d 720, 724 (Nev. 2011) (expanding the scope of Nevada’s Rule 
of Professional Conduct that mirrors Model Rule 4.4(b)). 
 79. Merits Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev. ex rel. County of 
Clark, 262 P.3d 720 (Nev. 2011). 
 80. Id. at 722–23. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (“A lawyer who receives a document or 
electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and 
knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information 
was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”).  
 84. Merits Incentives, 262 P.3d at 724. 
 85. Id. at 725 (adopting a “notification requirement to apply in situations where an 
attorney receives documents anonymously or from a third party unrelated to the litigation,” 
and finding that the lawyer “met his ethical duties because he promptly notified” opposing 
counsel of his receipt of the disk). 
 86. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011) 
(citing Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., 270 F.R.D. 392, 398 (N.D. Ill. 2010)). 
 87. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011). 
 88. Id. 
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should govern a receiving lawyer’s conduct, however, courts and lawyers 
have been left to determine for themselves whether expanding the scope 
of Rule 4.4(b) is appropriate.89 
3. Setting New Standards 
A third approach that courts have taken in response to Rule 4.4(b)’s 
ambiguity is to determine whether a lawyer or a lawyer’s firm should be 
sanctioned based on whether the potentially privileged or confidential 
documents at issue were either obtained by improper means or utilized in 
an improper manner.90 For example, during a divorce proceeding in In re 
Eisenstein,91 a husband accessed his wife’s personal email and obtained 
pay records as well as a list of examination questions the wife’s lawyer 
emailed to her in preparation for trial.92 The husband then delivered this 
information to his lawyer, who did not notify the opposing party and later 
used the information during pretrial settlement negotiations.93 The court 
sanctioned the lawyer for utilizing his client’s improper acquisition of the 
opposing party’s personal information.94 
In contrast, the court in Niceforo v. UBS Global Asset Management 
Americas, Inc.95 allowed the defendant’s lawyer to use allegedly 
privileged information found in a notebook belonging to the plaintiff, 
despite having failed to notify the opposing party upon his receipt of the 
notebook.96 The court allowed the use of information contained in the 
 
 89. See Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 
2831485, at *10 (D. Kan. Jun. 30, 2017) (“Despite the lack of clarity and direction from 
both the Kansas ethics rules and ABA Model Rules and opinions, the Court draws one 
important conclusion: although the black-letter rules do not specifically govern the 
situation currently before this court, these rules do not end the Court’s inquiry.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Xyngular Corp. v. Schenkel, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1273, 1315–16 (D. Utah 
2016) (criticizing the defendant’s lawyers for “unilaterally decid[ing] whether the 
documents [at issue] were proprietary, confidential, or privileged,” and concluding that the 
court had the inherent authority “to sanction a party who circumvents the discovery 
process”). 
 91. In re Eisenstein, 485 S.W.3d 759 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 92. Id. at 761.   
 93. Id. at 761–62. On the second day of trial the husband’s lawyer handed the wife’s 
lawyer a stack of exhibits that included the wife’s lawyer’s direct examination questions. 
Id. at 761. Before the husband’s lawyer turned over these documents, neither the wife nor 
her lawyer was aware that the husband and his lawyer possessed this information. Id. At 
the request of the wife’s lawyer, a hearing was held and the husband admitted to improperly 
accessing the wife’s email, and the husband’s lawyer admitted that he had reviewed the 
information and did not notify the wife’s lawyer upon his receipt of the documents. Id. at 
761. 
 94. Id. at 763–64. 
 95. Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Mgmt. Americas, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 428 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014).  
 96. Id. at 431–36. 
 2019 A SHOT IN THE DARK 767 
notebook at trial and denied sanctions on the ground that the notebook was 
not obtained by unlawful means.97 
Because courts have taken different approaches in their efforts to 
propose a proper course of conduct, inconsistent standards of conduct have 
developed.98 As a result, lawyers are faced with tough ethical questions 
when they are the intentional recipient of unsolicited privileged or 
confidential documents.99 Lawyers must balance the tension between their 
duty to zealously advocate for their clients while simultaneously staying 
within the boundaries of proper legal ethics.100 However, because such 
boundaries are ill-defined, a lawyer’s chosen course of conduct can have 
significant consequences if viewed as improper in the eyes of a court.101 If 
Rule 4.4(b) was amended to make it applicable in circumstances where 
privileged or confidential documents are intentionally disclosed, lawyers 
and courts would no longer struggle to distinguish between proper and 
improper ethical conduct.102 
III. ANALYSIS 
The different approaches that courts have taken to determine whether 
obligations should be placed upon a lawyer that is the intentional recipient 
of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents have created more 
harm than good.103 The varying standards adopted by courts have 
cultivated an erratic ethical landscape that breeds uncertainty and 
continues to create problems for lawyers.104 
The problem is further complicated by the duty of zealous 
advocacy.105 Lawyers are more likely to rely on the authorities, or the lack 
 
 97. Id. at 432, 436 (stating that before the court can exercise its authority to impose 
sanctions, it “must find that the material was obtained improperly”). 
 98. See, e.g., In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 351–52 (Tex. 1998) (relying on 
withdrawn ABA Formal Opinion 94-382); Niceforo, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 432 (creating a new 
standard for determining whether sanctions are appropriate); Stengart v. Loving Care 
Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 665 (N.J. 2010) (expanding the scope of Rule 4.4(b) to reach 
its conclusion).  
 99. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 
2831485, *4–5, *18–23 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017) (finding that the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
violated their ethical obligations despite consulting rules of professional conduct, case law, 
and their professional peers in making their decision not to notify opposing counsel of their 
receipt of potentially privileged or confidential documents). 
 100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., paras. 1–2, 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).   
 101. See, e.g., Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *16–23. 
 102. See infra Section III.A.  
 103. See infra Sections III.A–.B.  
 104. See Chamberlain Grp. v. Lear Corp., 270 F.R.D. 392, 398 (N.D. Ill. 2010) 
(describing a situation in which the plaintiffs’ counsel disagreed with the court regarding 
the applicability of authority governing a lawyer’s obligations upon the receipt of 
privileged or confidential documents from an anonymous source). 
 105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).   
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thereof, that allow them to capitalize on advantageous opportunities to 
advance their clients’ cases.106 Because the ethical boundaries surrounding 
a recipient lawyer’s obligations are ill-defined, disagreement may arise 
among lawyers and courts about what the proper standard of conduct 
should be.107 When this disagreement occurs, lawyers and their clients are 
subject to the possibility of having to cope with court-imposed 
sanctions.108 
Therefore, a clear standard is needed to assist lawyers in navigating 
this ethical terrain without pushing the limits of ethical behavior too far. 
This section will first argue that because the ABA has not adopted a clear 
standard, and because various jurisdictions have taken different 
approaches, lawyers find it difficult to predict where a court will draw the 
line between proper and improper ethical conduct.109 Second, this section 
will explain how a lawyer’s duty of zealous advocacy exacerbates the issue 
by pressuring a lawyer to push ethical boundaries when they are ill-
defined.110 Ultimately, this section will recommend that the ABA adopt a 
clear standard requiring a lawyer to notify the opposing party upon the 
intentional receipt of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents.111 
A. The Difficulties in Distinguishing Between Proper and 
Improper Conduct 
When a court is faced with addressing a lawyer’s duties and 
obligations upon the intentional receipt of unsolicited privileged or 
confidential documents, the varying standards adopted in different 
 
 106. See HAZARD, supra note 11, at 2–3; see also Trial Order, Eastern Waste of New 
York, Inc. v. Salron Diner Assocs., Inc., No. 15892-98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 14, 2000), 2000 
WL 35917304 (stating that the “practice of law has lost the collegiality it once enjoyed,” 
and that the “time honored rule of ‘Cut your adversary a break if it doesn’t hurt the client’ 
has given way to “Cut your adversary’s throat, if you have the chance.’”). 
 107. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017) (citing 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991)) (stating that federal courts have 
inherent authority to “‘fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct [that] abuses the judicial 
process’”); see also Douglas J. Pepe, Persuading Courts to Impose Sanctions on Your 
Adversary, LITIGATION, Winter 2010, at 21, 21 (“Each state has its own set of sanctions 
powers. Often . . . they are modeled after those in federal court.”).  
 108. For example, agency law can be used to hold parties accountable for the conduct 
of their lawyers. See, e.g., Gripe v. City of Enid, 312 F.3d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(“Plaintiff argues against the harshness of penalizing him for his attorney’s conduct. But 
there is nothing novel here. Those who act through agents are customarily bound by their 
agents’ mistakes. It is no different when the agent is an attorney.”).  
 109. See infra Section III.A.  
 110. See infra Section III.B. 
 111. See infra Section III.C.  
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jurisdictions clash.112 The best way to evaluate the current implications of 
these inconsistencies is to view a recent case that directly addressed 
whether obligations should be placed upon a recipient lawyer.113 In 2016, 
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas in Raymond v. 
Spirit AeroSystems Holdings114 ultimately decided the issue of which 
approach to take in addressing a lawyer’s duties and obligations under 
such circumstances.115 
In Raymond, a collective action was brought against Spirit 
AeroSystems, Inc. and its owner, Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc. 
(collectively “Spirit”), by former Spirit employees alleging employment 
discrimination.116 The complaint was filed on behalf of more than 200 
former employees and alleged that Spirit violated the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act117 when carrying out its plans to reduce the size of its 
work force.118 The heart of the decision, however, rested on the conduct of 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers prior to the commencement of a phased discovery 
plan.119 
In early 2014, the plaintiffs’ lawyers conducted an investigation into 
the viability of legal claims against Spirit.120 During their investigation, 
the director of the labor union121 to which the former employees were 
members provided the plaintiffs’ lawyers with a packet of documents that 
he claimed were anonymously delivered to the union’s office.122 Upon 
 
 112. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 
2831485, *8 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017) (stating that “[n]o one authority is entirely 
persuasive”). 
 113. See id. at *2.  
 114. Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 2831485 
(D. Kan. June 30, 2017).  
 115. See id. at *7 (stating that the “central issue before the court” was whether recipient 
attorneys had an obligation to notify opposing counsel that they had “anonymously 
received” potentially privileged or confidential documents, and whether the recipient 
lawyers also had an obligation to refrain from using them). 
 116. Id. at *1. 
 117. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012 & Supp. 
2017). 
 118. Complaint at 2–3, Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282 
(D. Kan. July 11, 2016) (alleging that Spirit specifically terminated, laid off, and refused 
to rehire its older employees in an attempt to avoid the possibility of incurring large 
healthcare claims). 
 119. Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *1–2. 
 120. Id. at *3. 
 121. See id. at *1. The workers that were terminated or laid off were all members of the 
Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace. Id.  
 122. Id. at *3. The package contained information relating to Spirit’s Human Resources 
department’s plans to lay off and terminate employees as part of a performance initiative. 
Id. The package of documents also included a handwritten note that read: “[T]his is 
information regarding the recent layoffs. This is the project plan for the year. Pay attention 
to the slides they will tell you what the goal was. This information is from [a] good source.” 
Id. 
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later review of the documents, the plaintiffs’ lawyers noticed that some of 
the pages were stamped “privileged.”123 The plaintiffs’ lawyers then 
ceased review of the documents and turned them over to their paralegal.124 
They instructed her to review the materials “only for the purpose of 
separating . . . and sealing [into] a separate envelope” any materials that 
were marked as “privileged.”125 The plaintiffs’ lawyers did not notify 
Spirit’s lawyers that they had received these documents.126 
The plaintiffs’ lawyers retained the documents and later used them in 
preparation of their complaint against Spirit.127 The plaintiffs’ lawyers 
were in possession of the documents for two years before Spirit became 
aware that the plaintiffs’ lawyers received the documents.128 Spirit’s 
lawyers moved for a protective order and sanctions.129 The court granted 
the motion in part and imposed sanctions upon the plaintiffs’ lawyers.130 
Before Raymond, there was no guiding authority from any court in 
Kansas nor the Tenth Circuit regarding the obligations of a lawyer upon 
the intentional receipt of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents 
from an anonymous source.131 The court in Raymond acknowledged the 
ABA’s opinion that “civil procedure rules, or other law may impose” 
obligations upon a lawyer, yet failed to include any “other law” in its 
 
 123. Id.   
 124. Id. at *3. 
 125. Id. Plaintiffs’ attorneys stated that before separating and sealing the privileged 
documents, they nor their paralegal read the documents for their content. Id. The paralegal 
also claimed that file maintenance was the extent of her involvement in the case. Id. The 
plaintiffs’ attorneys received a second package containing Spirit documents from an 
anonymous source. Id. at *4. Upon realizing that some of the documents were marked as 
“privileged,” the plaintiffs’ attorneys again ceased review and gave them to their paralegal 
for review and separation. Id.   
 126. Id. at *4. 
 127. Id. at *5. The complaint was filed on July 11, 2016. Id. 
 128. Id. at *1, *3–4. The plaintiffs’ received the two sets of documents in the spring of 
2014. On October 19, 2016, the court held a scheduling conference regarding the parties’ 
discovery proposal. Id. at *2. At that conference, plaintiffs’ counsel informed the court that 
they had received potentially privileged or confidential documents from an anonymous 
source. Id. 
 129. Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *6.  
 130. Id. at *18–23. The court did not disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel; however, the court 
ruled that they were required to “certify, for each set of all future documents produced or 
discovery responses, that the information upon which the group of responses [was] based 
ha[d] been independently gathered.” Id. at *19. The court also ordered that Spirit was 
entitled to recover “legal fees and costs that they would not have incurred, but for plaintiffs’ 
[counsel’s] retention of the documents.” Id. at *21. In addition, the court rendered the 
motion for a protective order “as moot” because it had “already addressed the return . . . 
and future use of the documents in the context of sanctions . . . .” Id. 
 131. See id. at *7 (stating that “[t]his is a novel issue in this district and . . . in this 
circuit”; the court also noted that while both parties have citied various authorities, “[n]o 
one authority is entirely persuasive”). 
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analysis.132 If guiding authority on the issue existed, then the court would 
have likely taken it into consideration because the court turned to many 
different types of authority in an attempt to find an answer.133 
A lawyer that is the intentional recipient of unsolicited privileged or 
confidential documents would face the same difficulty in trying to 
determine a proper course of conduct.134 Thus, when this “other law” is 
not clear, ensuring that one’s conduct is consistent with proper ethical 
behavior can hardly be considered straightforward.135 
The central issue that makes ethical decisions in these circumstances 
difficult is the unpredictability of courts drawing the line between proper 
and improper ethical conduct.136 The ABA has stated that courts, “pursuant 
to their supervisory authority,” may impose obligations upon a recipient 
lawyer.137 However, when a lack of precedent on the issue exists within a 
particular jurisdiction, predicting how a court will choose to address the 
problem becomes even more difficult for lawyers.138 For example, despite 
the inadequacy of guiding authority, the court in Raymond found it 
“entirely appropriate to analogize” the issue presented in the case with 
Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b).139 Kansas Rule of 
Professional Conduct 4.4(b) is identical to Rule 4.4(b).140 The court stated 
that it would be “nonsensical to apply a separate . . . standard to 
intentionally-disclosed documents.”141 
However, the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Raymond clearly did not 
anticipate the court’s approach, and their position on the issue is not 
entirely unfounded.142 The ABA’s opinion on the matter is consistent with 
that of the plaintiffs’ lawyers in that Rule 4.4(b) does not apply to the 
 
 132. See id. at *9; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 
11-460 (2011).   
 133. See Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *7–16 (analyzing the nature of the 
documents, Rules of Professional Conduct, Kansas Ethical Rules, ABA Model Rules and 
Opinions, Kansas Pillars of Professionalism, and illustrative caselaw). 
 134. See id. at *4 (describing how the plaintiffs’ lawyers turned to many types of 
authority in hopes of finding an answer). 
 135. See id. at *7, *14 (noting how the court was unable to find any authority that was 
“entirely persuasive,” and instead relied on its inherent authority to impose sanctions). 
 136. Compare Foss Mar. Co. v. Brandewiede, 359 P.3d 905, 910 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) 
(declining to rely on withdrawn ABA Formal Opinion 94-382), with In re RSR Corp., 475 
S.W.3d 775, 778 (Tex. 2015) (relying on a test based on withdrawn ABA Formal Opinion 
94-382). 
 137. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011).  
 138. See, e.g., Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *4 (noting that the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
researched ethics rules and caselaw but were unable to determine what ethical obligations 
they had upon the receipt of privileged and confidential documents). 
 139. Id. at *14. 
 140. KAN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (2014); see also MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).   
 141. Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *14. 
 142. See id. at *5, *7. 
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specific facts present in Raymond.143 The difference between the position 
held by the plaintiffs’ lawyers and the court’s approach to the issue 
suggests that these complications could have been avoided all together.144 
With no guiding authority, the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Raymond came 
to the conclusion that retaining the documents at issue was proper.145 The 
decision by the plaintiffs’ lawyers was a decision that they believed to be 
within the bounds of the law.146 In reaching their decision to retain the 
documents, the plaintiffs’ lawyers researched the Kansas Rules of 
Professional Conduct and Tenth Circuit caselaw.147 However, the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers found that none of the authorities governed the specific 
issue that they were facing.148 
Moreover, the severity of this issue is demonstrated by the fact that 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Raymond were regarded as “experienced” 
litigators.149 Knowing very well that a poor decision may come back to 
haunt them and, more importantly, harm their client’s case, inferring that 
experienced lawyers chose to violate their ethical responsibilities is 
unconvincing.150 If clear guiding authority existed, the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
likely would have discovered its existence when they conducted an inquiry 
into their obligations after initially receiving the first package of 
documents.151 The plaintiffs’ lawyers would then have been able to avoid 
the negative consequences associated with being sanctioned by simply 
conforming their conduct to accepted standards of legal ethics.152 
 
 143. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) 
(stating that “[w]hether a lawyer may be required to take any action in such an event is a 
matter of law beyond the scope of Rule 4.4(b)”). 
 144. See Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *7 (“Plaintiffs [insisted] they acted under the 
guide of ethics advice, and they maintain a ‘cease review and notify’ standard for 
intentionally-produced documents does not exist in the applicable law.”). 
 145. Id. at *4. 
 146. Id. at *7. 
 147. Id. at *4.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at *2 (stating that “[n]ot only are these parties no strangers to litigation, but 
many of the counsel are familiar with one another and the parties they regularly represent, 
and they are regarded as experienced counsel”). 
 150. See id. at *5, *7. The plaintiffs’ lawyers were made aware of the negative 
consequences associated with failing to notify opposing counsel upon receipt of 
inadvertently sent documents. Id. at *5. They maintained that a “‘cease review and notify’ 
standard for intentionally-produced documents” did not exist, and that because no standard 
existed, “there was no basis for sanctions.” Id. at *7. 
 151. See id. at *4. On the same day the plaintiffs’ lawyers received the first package of 
documents, they researched the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, Kansas caselaw, 
and Tenth Circuit caselaw regarding their obligations. Id. 
 152. See id. at *18–23.   
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With minimal guidance from case law, state ethics rules, and the 
ABA Model Rules,153 the idea that other lawyers in situations similar to 
the lawyers in Raymond would have conducted themselves in a similar 
manner is reasonable. Proof that lawyers may be inclined to conduct 
themselves similarly is found within the Raymond case itself.154 In 
addition to consulting state ethics rules and caselaw, the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
sought advice from two other lawyers and a disciplinary administrator 
regarding their possible obligations after their receipt of the documents.155 
These advisors reached the same conclusion as the plaintiffs’ lawyers.156 
Importantly, none of the advisors recommended that the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
either notify Spirit’s lawyers of their receipt of the documents, or make 
any effort to return them.157 The fact that these other lawyers, with no 
personal interest in the litigation, reasoned that no authority created an 
obligation for the plaintiffs’ lawyers to notify Spirit illustrates the lack of 
clarity on this issue.158 
Given the likelihood of confusion surrounding a lawyer’s obligations 
upon the intentional receipt of unsolicited privileged or confidential 
documents, establishing a clear standard to guide lawyers in these 
situations is necessary.159 The court’s decision in Raymond demonstrates 
that the current lack of guidance on the issue breeds problems for both 
lawyers and courts.160 A clear standard is necessary to provide lawyers 
with notice of what conduct is acceptable when a lawyer receives 
unsolicited privileged or confidential documents that are intentionally 
disclosed by a third party. 
B. The Duty of Zealous Advocacy Pressures Lawyers to Push 
Ill-defined Ethical Boundaries 
Lawyers have an obligation to “maximize the likelihood that [their] 
client’s objectives will be attained.”161 This obligation stems from 
 
 153. See id. at *9–10 (finding that there is a “lack of clarity and direction from both the 
Kansas ethics rules and ABA Model Rules and opinions”). 
 154. See Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *5.   
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See, e.g., id. at *7 (“Plaintiffs [insisted] they acted under the guide of ethics advice, 
and they maintain a ‘cease review and notify’ standard for intentionally-produced 
documents does not exist in the applicable law.”). 
 160. See id. at *7, *16–22 (finding that sanctions were appropriate even though the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers insisted that no authority placed an ethical obligation upon them to 
notify the opposing lawyers that they had received unsolicited privileged and confidential 
documents from an anonymous source).  
 161. David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client 
Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1004 (1990).  
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lawyers’ duty to zealously assert their “client’s position under the rules of 
the adversary system.”162 At the same time, however, “as officer of the 
legal system,” lawyers also have an obligation to “demonstrate respect for 
the legal system” and “uphold legal process.”163 Thus, lawyers must 
balance the tension between their duty to zealously advocate for their 
clients while simultaneously staying within the boundaries of proper legal 
ethics.164 However, when the boundaries of legal ethics are ill-defined, 
lawyers are inclined to test the limits of the law and uphold their client’s 
position.165 This truth is bolstered by the fact that the “[r]ules of legal 
ethics are not universal” and lawyers are pressured to “give a preferred 
position” to their clients.166 
The pressure to defend a client’s position is derived from the reality 
that lawyers do not “merely encounter choices between the conflicting 
interests of others,” but rather make “a business out of such encounters 
and partisan positions for money.”167 As a result, in the face of uncertainty 
regarding their ethical duties, lawyers are inclined to capitalize on the 
opportunity to utilize unsolicited privileged or confidential documents to 
advance their client’s position.168 
The tension between advancing a client’s position and staying within 
ill-defined boundaries of proper legal ethics is particularly troublesome 
when a lawyer is the intentional recipient of unsolicited privileged or 
confidential documents that belong to an opposing party.169 Such 
circumstances carry a risk of adverse consequences regardless of whether 
the lawyer chooses to exploit the unsolicited documents or notify the 
opposing party.170 For example, if a recipient lawyer elects to utilize an 
opposing party’s privileged or confidential documents without notifying 
the opposing party, a client’s case can be negatively impacted if a court 
 
 162. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., paras. 1–2, 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) 
(“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the 
adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but 
consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others.”). 
 163. Id. paras. 1, 5. 
 164. Id. paras. 1–2, 5.  
 165. See HAZARD, supra note 11, at 2 (stating that the “application [of] ethics involves 
a . . . complicated scheme of distinctions and excuses based on role, relationships and 
practical necessity,” and that the office of [a] lawyer begins with having to make 
distinctions among persons.”). 
 166. See id. at 2. 
 167. See id. at 2–3.  
 168. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 
2831485, at *5 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017). 
 169. See, e.g., id. at *7 (noting that the plaintiffs’ lawyers believed they were acting in 
accordance with proper legal ethics). 
 170. See, e.g., id. at *7, 18–23 (finding that sanctions were appropriate even though the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers believed they were acting in accordance with proper legal ethics). 
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views the conduct as improper.171 Conversely, if a lawyer elects to refrain 
from taking advantage of the opportunity to utilize the documents 
received, then the lawyer may not be acting in accordance with the client’s 
best interests.172 
The consequences of this tension between zealous advocacy and ill-
defined ethical boundaries is demonstrated in Raymond.173 The plaintiffs’ 
lawyers were presented with documents that significantly advanced their 
clients’ case.174 After consulting ethics rules and caselaw, the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers believed they were under no ethical obligation to immediately 
notify the opposing lawyers because the plaintiffs’ lawyers were the 
intentional recipients of the documents.175 
However, despite the lack of guiding authority,176 the court found that 
a lawyer’s inquiry into the proper course of conduct should not be limited 
to ethics rules themselves.177 The court stated that not only do lawyers have 
a duty to adhere to the rules of professional conduct, but lawyers also have 
a duty to “perform their work professionally by behaving in a manner that 
reflects the best legal traditions, with civility, courtesy, and 
consideration.”178 Arguably, the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Raymond met this 
standard of professionalism and acted courteously.179 The plaintiffs’ 
lawyers intended to bring the documents to the court’s attention at the 
initial scheduling conference, kept the documents under seal, and did not 
review any documents that were marked as “privileged.”180 
 
 171. See Xyngular Corp. v. Schenkel, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1273, 1300–01 (2016) (citing 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)) (stating that courts have “inherent 
powers to sanction a full range of litigation misconduct that abuses the judicial process,” 
and that such authority is “necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to 
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases”).  
 172. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., paras. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).  
 173. See Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *18–23 (ruling that the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ 
decision to utilize the privileged and confidential documents that they received was 
improper and warranted sanctions). 
 174. Id. at *3.  
 175. Id. at *7 (“Plaintiffs [insisted] they acted under the guide of ethics advice, and they 
maintain a ‘cease review and notify’ standard for intentionally-produced documents does 
not exist in the applicable law.”). 
 176. See id. (stating that “[t]his is a novel issue in this district and . . . in this circuit”). 
The court in Raymond also noted that while both parties have citied various authorities, 
“[n]o one authority is entirely persuasive.” Id.  
 177. See id. at *14; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal 
Op. 11-460 (2011); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 
(2011) (stating that “other law” may impose obligations upon a receiving lawyer that may 
prevent the lawyer from keeping and using the received documents). 
 178. See Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *10. 
 179. See id. at *4.  
 180. See id. After the plaintiffs’ lawyers found no governing authority on the issue, they 
“decided to retain the documents for three reasons: (1) to seek in camera review by the 
[c]ourt once a lawsuit was filed; (2) out of concern that relevant information was being 
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More importantly, the key takeaway from the Raymond decision is 
that the sanctions ordered could have been avoided all together.181 The 
decision the plaintiffs’ lawyers ultimately had to make was grounded in 
the tension between advancing their client’s interests and fulfilling their 
ethical obligations.182 If a clear standard outlining the proper course of 
conduct upon the intentional receipt of privileged or confidential 
documents existed, the plaintiffs’ lawyers would have been able to act in 
a manner that the court would view as ethically proper.183 Instead, the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers had to speculate as to whether their chosen course of 
conduct would be regarded as proper ethical behavior in the eyes of the 
court.184 
In sum, because lawyers have an obligation to “maximize the 
likelihood that [their] client’s objectives will be attained” and a competing 
interest to “uphold legal process,” the boundaries of proper ethical conduct 
need to be clearly defined.185 Without clear boundaries, lawyers are 
inclined to capitalize on the opportunity to utilize unsolicited privileged or 
confidential documents to advance their client’s position.186 
C. Recommendation 
The ABA is in the best position to set forth a clear standard outlining 
the proper course of conduct that a lawyer should follow upon the 
intentional receipt of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents.187 
The ABA should amend Rule 4.4(b) to broaden its scope and make it 
applicable in circumstances where privileged or confidential documents 
are intentionally disclosed.188 By amending Rule 4.4(b) to govern in 
situations where documents are intentionally disclosed, both lawyers and 
courts will no longer struggle to distinguish between proper and improper 
 
destroyed by Spirit; and (3) because [they] did not review the privilege-marked documents 
and kept them sealed, [they] believed Spirit could suffer no harm.” Id. 
 181. See id. at *4–5 (highlighting the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ efforts to identify guiding 
authority).  
 182. Id. at *7.  
 183. See id.  
 184. See id. at *7 (recognizing that the plaintiffs’ lawyers believed they were acting in 
accordance with proper legal ethics). 
 185. Luban, supra note 161, at 1004; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
pmbl., paras. 1, 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
 186. See, e.g., Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *5. 
 187. Even though the Model Rules are not binding, they serve as a model for states’ 
rules that govern and guide the ethical conduct of lawyers. HAZARD, supra note 11, at 28.   
 188. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (“A 
lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the 
representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the 
document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify 
the sender.”). 
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ethical conduct.189 Moreover, with guidance from the ABA, lawyers will 
be better able to manage the tension between their duty of zealous 
advocacy and staying within the boundaries of proper legal ethics.190 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Rule 4.4(b) was adopted because lawyers sometimes receive 
confidential or privileged information that was mistakenly sent or 
produced by opposing parties or their lawyers.191 Under Rule 4.4(b), if a 
“lawyer knows or reasonably should know” that the information was sent 
inadvertently, then the lawyer is required to “promptly notify the 
sender.”192 However, the ABA has made clear that Rule 4.4(b) does not 
impose any duties or obligations upon a lawyer that is the intentional 
recipient of such information.193 
As a result, courts disagree with respect to the duties and obligations 
that should be placed upon a recipient lawyer.194 The varying standards 
adopted by courts has created confusion amongst lawyers.195 This 
quandary is further complicated by “adversarial dynamics” that pressure 
lawyers to push the limits of ill-defined ethical boundaries.196 
Given the harsh consequences associated with being penalized as a 
recipient lawyer whose course of conduct is viewed as improper in the 
eyes of a court, uniformity within the courts is required.197 The ABA 
should amend Rule 4.4(b) to broaden its scope and make it applicable in 
circumstances where privileged or confidential documents are 
intentionally disclosed.198 
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